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This paper examines the announcement effects ofbank
holding company (BHC) securities issuance on theircom-
mon stock prices. A key finding is that since December
1981 whenobjective minimum capitalregulations wereput
intoplace, announcementsofcommon stock issuance have
been associated with statistically significant negative ab-
normal common stock returnsfor BHCs under regulatory
pressure to boost capital. No such effects werefoundfor
highly-capitalized BHCs that were not under regulatory
pressure to boost capital. These results suggest that
poorly-capitalized BHCs will be reluctant to issue com-
mon stock to meetcapital requirements. They also suggest
that the deadweight costs associated with common stock
issuance by well-capitalized banking organizations are
small or nonexistent.
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Bank and bank holding company (BHC) capital regula-
tion is becoming an increasingly important tool to limit
banking risk. More capital relative to assets provides a
greater cushion to absorb losses. Moreover, as Furlongand
Keeley(l987a, 1987b)show,more capital relative toassets
reduces banks' incentives to increase asset risk. Thus, an
increase in BHCs' capital-to-asset ratios should reduce the
risk exposure of the deposit insurance system.'
Capital regulation was strengthened- in December 1981
when specific bank and bank holding company minimum
capital standards were introduced for the first time, a
departure from the previous subjective peer-group typ~ of
capital regulation. In addition, these minimum capIt~1
requirements were modified in 1983 to include the multi-
national bank holding companies and again in 1985 to
standardize the minimum requirements for all banks and
bank holding companies. 3
In early August 1988, the Board of Governors adopted
an evenmore stringent set of "risk-based" capital require-
ments for BHCs based on an international agreement
among the twelve leading industrial countries. These new
standards represent an important departure from the cur-
rent ones in that they require different amounts of capital
based on an assessment of an asset's risk class. They also
require capital to be held against off-balance-sheet items.
Finally, they require more capital for assets in the highest
risk class than do current standards and also define capital
differently than the current U.S. rules do.
To meet these new capital-to-asset ratio requirements,
many banks and bank holding companies either will have
to sell assets or increase capital by retaining a higher
proportion of earnings and/or raising external ~apital.
BHCs raise external capital by selling a range of different
types of securities, including common stock, preferred
stock, mandatory convertible debt, convertible debt, and
straight subordinated debt.
Ideally, capital regulations should be designed to attain
a given degree of risk exposure of the deposit insurance
system while minimizing thedeadweightcosts i~posed ~n
the banking organizations subject to the regulations. ThIS
paper examines the stock market's reaction to BHCs'
securities issuance to learn more about the effects of
capital regulation on the banking firm. Specifically, the
effects on BHCs' stock prices following the announcement
3of the issuance of different kinds of securities may reveal
whether increasing capital imposes costs on banking or-
ganizations and whetherincreasing capital reduces the risk
exposure of the deposit insurance fund.
Two novel aspects of this study are its focus on the
differences between the stock price effects for BHCs under
regulatory pressure to augment capital and those that raise
external capital voluntarily, and its analysis of the changes
in these effects after the new specific, objective minimum
capital regulations were instituted in December 1981. Ifind
statistically significant negative stock price effects associ-
ated with common stock issuance for banking organiza-
tions under regulatory pressure to augment capital and
positive, but not statistically significant effects for other
BHCs. Thus, unlike some studies that argue that an-
nouncement effects should be absolutely smaller forBHCs
that are known to be under close regulatory scrutiny, I find
justthe opposite.
This study is organized as follows. Section I reviews the
theory and evidence regarding the effects of securities
issuance by nonbank firms and discusses the implications
for BHCs' securities issuance. Section II reviews the prior
studies of BHC securities issuance. Section III discusses
the methodology and data employed in this study and
Section IV presents the results. Section V presents a
summary and conclusions.
I. Theory and Evidence from Nonbanking Firms: Implications for Bank Holding Companies
There is now an extensive literature regarding the valua-
tion effects of securities issuance by industrial and utility
firms. Modigliani and Miller (1958) have shown that in
competitive markets without distortions, such as taxes,
bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and asymmetric informa-
tion, a firm's capital structure is irrelevant. If so, securities
issuance should not affect a firm's stock price."
However, as Smith (1986) points out, empirical studies
have found statistically significant negative stock price
effects of common stock issuance by industrial firms of
approximately - 3.14 percent, as well as negative signifi-
cant effects associated with the issuance of preferred stock
and bonds that are convertible into common stock. No
statistically significant effects are found for other types of
securities, although usually the point estimates are nega-
tive. Utility firms also have negative, but much smaller,
announcement effects associated with common stock issu-
ance, averaging about -.75 percent.
In an attempt to explain these empirical findings, theory
has developed along two main lines. One argues that the
existence of such distortions as taxes, bankruptcy costs,
and agency costs means that capital structure does matter
and that securities issuance will affect stock prices. The
other line of reasoning relies on information asymmetries
and signalling. Below, these two types of theories are
discussed.
Capital Structure Theory
Although firms may indeed have optimal capital struc-
tures, it is unclear whether the existence of optimal capital
structures could explain the negative stock price effects
associated with common stock issuance by industrial and
utility firms. The reason is that voluntary securities issu-
ance should always represent a movement toward (and cer-
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tainly not away from) a firm's optimum capital structure.
As a result, the effects of a voluntary securities issuance
(which affects capital structure) should be positive or zero.
Thus, while capital structure theory might be able to
explain the negative effects of involuntary securities issu-
ance, it seems unlikely that it could explain the negative
effects associated with voluntary securities issuance. As a
result, most of the literature has focused on signalling
theories to try to explain the stock price announcement
effects of securities issuance.
Signalling Theories
A variety of signalling theories have been built on the
premise that management has information about the value
of a firm that is not available to outside investors. Thus, the
announcement of a security issuance is taken by investors
as a signal that reveals at least some of management's
inside information.
Forexample, Miller and Rock (1985) argue that net new
external financing is a signal of lower earnings because
internal financing would be used if earnings were suffi-
cient. However, this argument implies that all types of
external financing should have negative announcement
effects and thus fails to explain the different effects of
different types of securities issuance.
Myers and Majluf(1984) argue that management has an
incentive to issue new stock when they believe the firm's
stock is overvalued. However, investors realize that the
firm's managers have such an incentive and take the
information of a new stock issuance as a signal that the
firm's stock is overvalued, which in turn causes the stock's
price to fall.
This theory can explain why managers would be reluc-
tant to issue new stock even to fund positive net present
Economic Review / Winter 1989value opportunities. Ifthe manager knows that the firm's
stock is undervalued, it would not be optimal to issue
securities to fund a new project that had a modest positive
net present value. It also would explain a preference for
internal financing as well as for the use of low-risk se-
curities, the values of which do not strongly depend on the
firm's value.
However, as Dybvig and Zender (1988) point out, in-
vestors would anticipate the tendency to pass up profitable
new projects and would pay a lower initial offering price
than if managers could somehow be induced to follow an
optimal investment policy. (That is, if initial investors
could be certain managers always would undertake posi-
tive net presentvalueprojects, theywould be willing topay
more for the stock at the initial offering.) Dybvig and
Zendergoon to show that anoptimal contractfor managers
can be devised to overcome the underinvestment problem.
Nonetheless, Dybvig and Zender show that even with
optimal managerial contracts, the existence of information
asymmetries between a firm's managers and its investors
will cause investors to treat securities issuance as a signal.
When the manager has good news about both the new and
old projects, internal financing can and will be used to
undertake new projects so that lack of need for external
financing will be viewed as a positive signal. Similarly,
when a manager has good news about a new project and
bad news about an old project, debt is issued, which has a
minimal effect on stock prices. However, when the man-
ager has bad news about both the new and old projects,
equity will be issued, providing a negative signal, which
causes the stock's price to fall.
In sum, even though the Myers and Majlufstory maybe
incomplete, securities issuance probably conveys informa-
tion about the performance of the existing assets ofthe firm
as well as the prospects for new projects. Thus, it seems
most likely that stock issuance is some sort of signal.5
Implications for Bank Holding Companies
It seems likely that signalling theory would apply to
securities issued by BHCs, as well as by nonbanking
firms. However, effects for BHCs might differ from those
of industrial firms because BHCs are so highly regulated.
The most common argument regarding the effects of
regulation is that the market's knowledge of regulatory
policy reduces the information that otherwise would be
revealed by a security issuance. For example, the stock
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price effects associated with announcements of utility
firms' common stock offerings are on average absolutely
smaller than those for industrial firms. Utility firms' tend-
encyto make repeated stock offerings (due to regulation)
and the factthat utilities' stock offerings often require prior
regulatory commission approval appear to diminish the
information content of actual announcements and thus may
explain why utilities have smaller absolute stock price
announcement effects than industrial firms.
Likewise, the information content and stock price an-
nouncement effects of BHCs' securities issuance might be
smaller (in absolute value) than those for nonregulated
firms, even though a BHC need not obtain prior regulatory
approval to issue new securities. The market's knowledge
of the BHC regulatory process might well dilute the
information content associated with a BHC's security
offering, particularly for organizations known to be under
regulatory pressure to boost capital. Moreover, since BHC
capital regulation shifted to objective, minimum standards
beginning in 1981, one would expect smaller absolute
stock price effects during the post-1981 period.
On the other hand, there are several reasons why the
stock price announcement effects associated with BHCs'
securities issuance might be more negative than those of
industrial firms. First, if the value of the deposit insurance
guarantee is capitalized in a BHC's common stock value, a
security issuance that is forced ona BHC by itsregulator in
an effort to diminish the risk exposure of the deposit
insurance fund could lead to a larger negative effect
because such an issuance would diminish the (option)
valueof the deposit insurance guarantee. In particular, one
would expect BHCs with low capital positions to experi-
ence larger negative announcement effects than would
highly-capitalized BHCs. 6 Similarly, a regulatory-induced
increase in capital could result in larger negative an-
nouncement effects because distortions such as taxes or
agency costs could make a forced change in capital struc-
ture awayfrom the BHC's private optimum costly.
One final reason that the announcement effects for
BHCs may be more negative than those for industrial and
utility firms is that regulators may have inside information
obtainedduring bank and bank holding company examina-
tions. Thus, a securities issuance by a BHC known by the
market to be under regulatory pressure to augment capital
might convey information about the firm's earning pros-
pects.
5II. Previous Empirical Research on BHCSecurities Issuance
Sincethere are theoretical arguments both for largerand
for smaller announcement effects for BHCs' securities
issuancethan for industrials', thequestion regarding which
forces dominate is basically an empirical one. Thus, in this
section the available empirical studies are reviewed. There
are several unpublished papers dealing with the effects of
bank: holding companies' securities issuance. These are
papers by Isberg and Brown (1987), Wansley and Dhillon
(1987), Wall and Peterson (1988), and Polonchek, Slovin,
and Sushka (1987).
IsbergandBrown
Isberg and Brown (1987) argue that for the 1981 to 1985
period," new common stock issues were the only type of
security issuance associated with statistically significant
negative common stock returns for BHCs both above and
below the contemporaneous capital standards. Although
two-day cumulative average prediction errors and Z statis-
tics are not reported, it appears that they found a -l.l
percenteffect for BHCsmeetingthe capital standards and a
- 2.0 percent effect for BHCs below the standards. How-
ever, since many BHCs issued capital prior to the imple-
mentation of new capital standards to be in compliance, it
appears that many of the events characterizedby this study
as common stock issues by BHCs above the currentstand-
ards were really issues intended to bring the holding
company into compliance with expected future standards.
Wansley andDhillon
Wansley and Dhillon (1987) examine the valuation ef-
fects of six types of securities issuance by BHCs between
1978 and 1985: common stock, preferred stock, convert-
ible preferred stock, straight debt-non-shelf, straight
debt-shelf, and debt-for-equity swaps. They find statis-
tically significant abnormal returns for common stock of
-1.5 percent, significant positive returns for preferred
stock of0.8percentand no significantabnormal returns for
other types of securities issuance. Since their estimate of
the size of the announcement effect associated with com-
mon stock issuance is much smaller than that found for
industrial firms, they argue that banking regulation, like
utility regulation, reduces the uncertainty and information
content of new securities issuance and therefore reduces
the absolute size of the stock price announcement effect. 8
Wall andPeterson
Wall and Peterson (1988) examine the valuation effects
of common stock, preferred stock, convertible debt, man-
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datory convertibledebt, and subordinateddebtissuanceby
BHCs from 1982 through 1986. One innovation of their
study is that they obtain the announcement day from the
Dow Jones News Service insteadof the WallStreetJournal
Indexas the other studies do. They argue that this allows
them to pinpoint the actual first trading day that would be
affectedbythe announcement. (Thus, they use only a one-
day event period.) They find a statistically significant
- 1.5 percent abnormal return forcommon stock issuance,
butuo significant effects for other types of securities
issuance.
Polonchek, et al.
Finally, Polonchek, Slovin, and Sushka (1987) follow a
methodology that is closest to that of this paper. They
examine the valuation effects of various types of securities
issuance for the 1975 to 1985 period and distinguish the
pre-1981 period from the post-1981 period. They also
distinguish the effects for multinational BHCs from those
for other BHCs.9
They find statistically significant negative abnormal
returns for common stock issuance prior to December 1981
(-1.7 percent) but not for any other types of securities. 10
After December 1981 abnormal returns also are negative
(-l.l percent) but are not statistically significant. Even
though the absolute decline in abnormal returns appears
not to be statistically significant, they argue that the
explanation for the decline is that during the post-1981
period, capital decisions were determined more by regula-
tory factors and thus contained a smaller (negative) infor-
mation component.
They also find larger negative point estimates for multi-
national BHCs' issuance of common stock during the
1982-1984 period than for those of other BHCs (-1.9
percentfor multinationals versus - 0.8percentforothers),
but it appears that the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. They argue that this apparent pattern arises because
the multinationals were not subject to capital requirements
until 1983. However, the main reason that the multination-
als were not subject to capital requirements until 1983 is
that none of these banking organizations would have met
the 1981 requirements in December 1981 (see Keeley
[1988]). That is, they were given time to raise capital and
bring themselves into compliance. This suggests that the
multinationals were, in fact, under regulatory pressure to
boost their capital by a large amount. Since the multina-
tionals actually were under severe regulatory pressure to
raise capital to meet the 1983 and 1985 standards before
Economic Review I Winter 1989those standards took effect, the evidence that their abnor-
mal returns were larger (in absolute value) than those of
otherBHCs actually contradicts the hypothesis thatregula-
tion would cause abnormal returns to decline in absolute
value.
Summary
On the whole, these studies support the hypothesis that
there are negative announcement effects associated with
common stock issuance by BHCs. The absolute values of
the effects for BHCs appear to besmaller than those found
forindustrial firms but larger than those found forutilities.
Although these results are broadly consistent with the
hypothesis that BHC regulation dilutes the information
content of securities offerings (since the absolute sizes of
theBHC effects are smaller than thoseforindustrial firms),
they are not inconsistent with a number of other hypoth-
eses.•Moreover, these results tell us little about which
aspects.of the regulatory process may account for the
smaller stock price effects.
With the exception of Polonchek, Slovin, and Sushka,
none of the papers tries to distinguish the announcement
effects before and after the December 1981 change in
capital regulation. Similarly, none of the papers tries to
distinguish the announcement effects for BHCs that had to
issuecapital to meet the guidelines from those thatdid not,
although Isberg and Brown do compare the results based
(apparently) on contemporaneous compliance with capital
guidelines. Moreover, none of the papers distinguishes the
effects before and after December 1981 for BHCs that
would have met the guidelines from those that would not
have." In the analysis below, I address these issues.
III. Methodology andData
Rjt = rate of return on BHCj's common stock
over period t,
Rmt = rate of return on the CRSP value-weighted market
index over period t,
aj , bj are coefficients for BHCi,
ejt = the error term for BHCj at time t, and
t is a time index in event time, that is, t = 81
is the announcement date.
This paper employs the market model to estimate the
abnormal stock price returns associated with BHCs' se-
curities issuance. Themodel isestimated with data oneach
BHC's daily stock returns fora60-day period beginning 80
trading days before and ending 20 trading days before the
announcement ofeach security issuance inorder toprovide
a forecast of what the stock's returns would have been
absent the announcementof a security issuance. (Astock's
rate of return is defined as the change in the stock's price
plus dividend payments, if any, divided by the original
stock price.) Then estimates of abnormal stock price
returns around the announcement date of securities issu-
ance are computedas thedifference betweenthe actualand
predicted value.
The market model is:
Rjt= aj + bj Rmt + ejt
where:
(1)
The prediction error for firmj on event day t is defined
as:
PEjt = Rjt - (aj + h j Rmt), (2)
where the symbol "A" denotes an estimated value.
The daily prediction errors can be averaged over events
of a particulartype (forexample, common stock issuance)
to produce daily average prediction errors:
APEt = (lIN) I j PEjt, (3)
where N is the number of events in the sample category.
Tests of statistical significance are based on standardized
prediction errors (see Mikkelson and Partch [1986]). Each
standardized prediction error (SPEjt) is defined as
SPEjt = PEjt /Sjt (4)
where
Sjt={Vj[l +11M+ (Rmt-RmF II;(Rmi-RmFlY/2 (5)
"Jisthe residual variance offirmj's market-model regres-
sion, M isthe number ofdays inthe period used toestimate
the market model (60 days), the summation over index i
indicates summation over the period used to estimate the
market model, ande: is the mean market return over the
estimation period. The average standardized prediction
error is:
(6)
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 7Assuming the individual daily prediction errors are
normally distributed, each SPEir isdistributed Student t. If
the individual prediction errors are cross-sectionally inde-
pendent, the following Z statistic is asymptotically dis-
tributed unit normal under the hypothesis that the average
standardized prediction error equals zero:
Z = Vii(ASPEr)· (7)
The empirical analysis focuses on abnormal returns
associated with the announcement of a security issuance.
Abnormal returns are defined as the sum of the prediction
errors forthe day preceding and the day the announcement
is reported. This procedure allows for the possibility that
the announcement may have been made during trading
hours the previous day and then reported the next day.
To test the hypothesis that the two-day prediction er-
ror averaged over N events (in a given category) is zero,
I compute the average two-day standardized prediction
error:
(8)
and thus the Z statistic is:
Z = v'N(AISPEr_,,t) (9)
Data on the returns of each BHC's security and the
overall market's returns are from the Center for Research
on Securities Prices (CRSP) daily returns tapes. Data on
securities issuance are from Irving Trust's Capital Se-
curitiesIssued:CommercialBanking for the 1977through
1986 period. Data from Compustat also are used to iden-
tify the quarters when major securities issues took place.
The announcement date is defined.as thedate of the first
report of a security issuance inthe WallStreetJournalor
the SEC registration date, whichever was first. Announce-
mentdates were obtained by searching the Wall Street
JournalIndexfor the year of and the year before the actual
issuance. The assumption is that the market generally only
becomes aware of a security issuance after it is formally
announced or that the probability of a security issuance
increases upon aformal announcement. Security issues not
reported in theWallStreetJournalwere not included in the
sample.
IV. Results
Dollar Volume ofSecurities Issuance
Charts 1,2, and 3 plot the dollar valueof debt, common
stock, and preferred stock issued by all BHCs included in
Irving Trust's publication. Since this publication includes
many very small issues, including those of small holding
companies, it appears to be a fairly complete account of
publicly-tradedBHCs' securities issuance. Charts 1,2,and
3 generally show increased security issuance in response
to capital regulation.
Chart 1 shows that the dollar volume of debt issued
increased greatly following the change in capital regula-
tion in December 1981.Since subordinated debt counts as
total capital and mandatory convertible debt counts as
primary capital, the large rise in debt issuance is not
surprising.
Chart 1

















8 Economic Review / Winter 1989Chart 2 shows a rise in the dollar volume of common
stock issued in 1981 and also an even larger rise in 1986.
Some of the increased issuance in 1981 could be in antic-
ipation of the newcapital guidelines. However,itisunclear
whether the even larger increase in 1986can be explained
by capital regulation unless it was in anticipation of the
risk-based guidelines which were very much in public
view at the time.
Finally, Chart 3 shows a large rise in preferred stock
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Table 1 displays the distribution of the sample of se-
curities announcement events analyzed in this study by
type and by year.All of these securitiesmettheregulatory
definition of either primary or total capital used between
1981 and 1986. Consistent with the evidence in Charts I
through 3, there are more security offerings per year
during the 1982-1986 period than during the 1975-1981
period. Also, debt issueswerethemostcommon, followed
by preferred stock, with common stock the least frequent
type of offering.
Table2showsthedistributionofthesampleofsecurities
offeringsby BHC and type of issue. It showsthat 34 bank
holding companies were responsible for the 155 security
offerings studied here. It also shows that most of the
holding companies issued several different types of se-
curities overthe 1975 to 1986period.
Prediction Errors 1975-1986
Abnormal returns-that is, two-day (cumulative) pre-
dictionerrors-averagedovertheentire1975-1986period
separately for each of seven classes of securities and
associated Z statistics are presented in Table 3. In addi-
tion, average abnormal returns and Z statistics are pre-
sented for simultaneous issues of debt and common stock
and debt and preferred stock.
This disaggregation of security type is based on the
regulatory definition of primary and total capital that was
used throughout the 1982-1986 period. All of the debt
issues analyzed meet the maturity requirement for inclu-
sionin the definitionoftotalcapital. All holdingcompany
debt legally is subordinated to deposits. Nonetheless, I
also examined separately debt that was explicitly called
subordinated from that not explicitly called subordinated.
No significant differences were found, however. 12
Theresults inTable3 indicatethat, onaverage, thereare
negativeabnormal returns associated with the issuance of
common stock and mandatory convertible debt (which
eventually will be converted into common stock). The
estimated magnitude of the announcementeffect forcom-
mon stock is 1.5 percent, a similar magnitude to that
found in the Wansley and Dhillon (1987) and Polonchek
et al. (1987) studies, both of which cover similar time
periods. Simultaneous issues of common stock and debt
also have significant negative announcement effects, as
mightbeexpectedduetothenegativeeffectofthecommon
stock issuance.13
Significant positive abnormal returns of 1.1 percent are
foundforperpetual preferred stock, a result similarto that
of Wansley and Dhillon (1987), who find an abnormal
return of 0.8 percent, and Poloncheket al., who find an
abnormal return of 1.57 percent for non-multinational
BHCs during the 1982-1984 period.
Theseresultsare somewhatsurprising, since,intermsof
10 Economic Review / Winter1989risk characteristics, perpetual preferred is most like com-
mon stock. However,there are two important differences.
First, the market may have viewed preferred stock as
implicitly insured in light of the FDIC's resolution of the
Continental Illinois failure in 1984. (The FDIC implicitly
insured preferred stock holders as well as debt holders
since the BHC was never declared insolvent.) Thus, pre-
ferred stock would haverisk characteristics more similarto
bank deposits than to common stock. Second, an issuance
of preferred stock may contain information about the
ability of the organization to meet preferred stock divi-
dends, which the market would view favorably.
I also find significant (at the 10 percent level) negative
prediction errors (- 0.74 percent) for mandatory convert-
ibledebt. Noneoftheother studiesfindsuch aneffect, but,
except for Wall and Peterson (1988), neither do they
distinguish between mandatory convertible debt and con-
vertible debt. Since convertible debt is usually convertible
at the issuer's option, it is much more like straight debt,
whereas mandatory convertible debt has risk characteris-
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 11tics similar to those of common stock and should have
similar announcement effects. However, aside from their
selection of a different sample of events, it is unclear why
Wall and Peterson's results differ.
As in all of the studies reviewed, I do not find significant
abnormal returns associated with straight debt. This find-
ing is similarto that for industrial and utility firms and thus
may reflect the low-risk nature of this security. Moreover,
the market may have regarded straight debt issued by
BHCs during this period as having a high probability of
being FDIC-insured following the Continental episode.
I also examined cumulative prediction errors for the 18-
day period between the estimation period and the (2-day)
announcement period and for the 18-day period after the
announcement period averaged over each type of security,
but none of the average cumulative prediction errors were
statistically significantly different from zero. This suggests
that the stock price announcement effects are permanent.
Moreover, the market model was estimated over two other
sample periods, one beginning 20 days after the announce-
ment period (days 100-158) and another including both the
pre- and post-announcement period samples (days 1-60
plus days 100-158) to test the robustness of the results.
The results were remarkably similar forall three estimation
periods.
In sum, these results strongly suggest negative an-
nouncement effects for issues of common stock and se-
curities with risk characteristics similar to common stock,
such as mandatory convertible debt. 14In the next sections,
I test for possible differences in effects over time and
between groups to determine whether deposit insurance
effects are important and through what avenues capital
regulation may affect the size of the announcementeffects.
12 Economic Review / Winter 1989Differences overTime
Table 4 presents two-day average prediction errors for
the period prior to the new capital regulations, January 1,
1975 through November 30, 1981, and for the period af-
ter the institution of the regulations, December 1, 1981
through December 31, 1986. There is a striking decline in
the absolute size of the announcement effect associated
withcommonstock issuance from - 2.6 percentto - 0.79
percent,.which is statistically significant at the one percent
level. No other significant differences are found. Thus, it
appears that the institution of capital regulation did have a
major effect on the stock price effect associated with
common stock issuance.
Polonchek et al. also find an absolute decline in the
(negative) effect of common stock issuance, although itis
half as large and not statistically significant. These dif-
ferences inresults maybe due to the more powerful statisti-
cal techniques and/or the longer sample period used in this
paper. My results for the 1982-1986 period, however,
differ in magnitude from those of Wall and Peterson, who
find negative statistically-significant effects for common
stock issuance of -1.5 percent for this period, possibly
because of the somewhat different sample they employ.
The standardexplanation for the apparentdecline is that
increased capital regulation made equity offerings more
predictable andthus diminished theirinformation content
especially compared to the information conveyed by offer-
ings made during the pre-December 1981 period, when
theywere more likely to be voluntary. To test this explana-
tion, I examine differences in announcement effects be-
tween the:group of BHCs voluntarily issuing capital and
thoseunderregulatory pressure to do so. If the information
content argument were correct, BHCs under regulatory
pressure to boost capital would experience less negative
announcement effects associated with stock issuance after
the new regulations took effect than would the other group
ofBHCs.
Differences Between Groups Over Time
Although objective minimum capital regulations were
phased in over the 1981 to 1985period, I would argue that
the 1985 standards were the ultimate goal even as early as
Federal Reserve Bankof San Francisco 131981.The main reason the 1985standards were not imme-
diately imposed was to give institutions time to raise the
necessary capital to bring them into compliance. In keep-
ing with this interpretation, this paper distinguishes those
banking organizations that would have met the 1985 pri-
mary capital requirements in 1981 from those that would
nothave.(See Keeley (1988].) Throughout the paper1refer
to the former as "capital sufficient" and the latter as
"capital deficient" banking organizations. As shown in
Keeley (1988), capital deficient banking organizations did
in fact increase capital both absolutely and relative to
capital sufficient organizations. 15
Table 5 presents separate estimates of the effects of
common stock issuance for capital deficient and sufficient
organizations both before and after the 1981 change in
capital regulation. I also examined the announcement
effects for each of the other types of securities issuance
analyzed in Table4, but nosignificant differences between
the time periods or between capital sufficient and deficient
groups were found.
The results in Table 5 suggest that the stock price effects
for capital sufficient BHCs changed from -1.2 percent in
the pre-1981 period to positive 1.5 percent in the post-1981
period. This change is statistically significant. Moreover,
although capital deficient BHCs' estimated effect declined
in absolute value, the change was not statistically signifi-
cant.
Ifincreased capital regulation reduced the signal con-
tent of common stock issuance, one would expect the
announcement effects to be less negative during the post-
1981 period. While Table 5 does show such a pattern for
each group separately, the change is not statistically sig-
nificant for the capital deficient organizations. Moreover,
simple signalling theory also would predict that capital
deficient BHCs' returns should be less negative than
capital sufficient BHCs' returns, which would be less
predictable and thus should contain more information.
These results thus cast doubt on this simple signalling
hypothesis since the pattern of results is opposite to that
which it would predict.
An alternative interpretation of these results is that
securities issuance diminishes the value of the deposit
insurance guarantee. The larger negative stock price ef-
fectsforcapital deficient banking organizations, especially
during the post-198l period, are consistent with the view
that the value of (underpriced) deposit insurance is cap-
italized in the share prices of capital deficient banking
organizations and that increases intheir capital diminished
the value of that asset.
A second, but not mutually exclusive hypothesis is that
regulators have inside information which is revealed to
investors by the nature of a security issuance. 16 Below, I
explore these two hypotheses further.
Capital Structure Effects
If the results in Table 5 primarily reflect a diminution
of the value of deposit insurance, in theory, issues that
have greater proportional effects on the capital-to-asset
14 Economic Review / Winter 1989ratio should have more negative abnormal returns. Conse-
quently, I regress abnormal returns on the size of the issue,
measured by the percentage change in the capital-to-asset
ratio caused by the common stock issue. 17
The results of such regressions, estimated using gener-
alized least squares with individual error variances calcu-
latedusing Equation 5, are reported in Table 6. Separate
estimates are presented for capital deficient and sufficient
banking organizations for three time periods: the entire
sample period, 1975-1986; the period prior to the new
capital regulations, December 1, 1975 through November
30, 1981; and the period after the new regulations were
introduced, December1,1981 through December31,1988.
Although the results of these regressions should be
viewed with caution because of the very small sample
sizes, they nevertheless do suggest a markedchange in the
relationship between capital deficient organizations' ab-
normal returns and the percentage effect of the common
stock issuance on the market value capital-to-asset ratio. IS
During the early period before explicit capital guidelines
were in place, issues that had larger effects on the capital-
to-asset ratio had less negative abnormal returns. This
suggests that issues during this period were voluntary,even
by banking organizations with low capital-to-asset ratios.
However, during the post-December 1981 period, the point
estimate suggests a negative relationship, although it is not
statistically significant. In theory, if the negative mean
abnormalreturns were due to a diminution of the value of
the deposit insurance guarantee, the relationship between
the size of the issue and abnormal returns should be
negative. Thus, these results are not inconsistent with this
hypothesis. However, given the small sample sizes and the
lack of statistical significance, neither do these results
provide strong support for this hypothesis.
The results for the capital sufficient banking organiza-
tions are more striking. They show, during the post-
December 1981 period, a statistically significant positive
relationship between abnormal returns and the size of the
issue. Thus, large issues (relative to capital) by organiza-
tions already meeting the capitalrequirements appear to be
taken by the market as positive signals. Since such issues
are voluntary,'? presumably they would not reflect a dimi-
nution in the value of the deposit insurance guarantee or an
implicit regulatory tax.
In sum, the results of these regressions provide some
supportforthe capital structure theory, which predicts that
issue size relative to capital is important and that stock
price effects should become more negative for capital
deficient organizations as the size of the issue increases.
They also suggest that the deadweight costs of common
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
stock issuance for well-capitalized banking organizations
are small or nonexistent since, on average, stock price
announcement effects are not negative and even become
more positive as the relative size of the issue increases.
InsideInformation
These results also are consistent with the second hy-
pothesis that the type of securities issued conveys inside
information about earning prospects obtained by regula-
tors during bank and bank holdingcompany examinations.
Since a banking organization's balance sheet is available
to outside investors, the market can readily determine
15whether the BHC is under regulatory pressure to increase
its capital ratio. However, the market does not necessarily
know the future prospects of the BHC or the method the
BHC will use to augment capital.
It seems likely that investors would look for informa-
tion about a BHe's prospects in the type of securities it
issues. Capital deficient BHCs that issue common stock
may be viewed by investors as needing to do so because
they are under regulatory pressure not to issue securities
that require increased payouts from earnings, such as debt
or preferred stock. Thus, a common stock issuance by a
capital deficient BHC may be a signal of management and
regulator skepticism about the BHC's ability to generate
sufficient future earnings to meet the cash flow require-
ments of additional debt or preferred stock or to generate
cash flowsufficient to permit the accumulation of retained
earnings to meet the new capital requirements. On the
other hand, if regulators and bank management believe
that the banking organization's future earnings prospects
are very good, retained earnings rather than a security
issuance can be used to meet higher future capital require-
ments. Moreover, a voluntary issue of common stock by a
capital sufficient BHC would notprovide a negative signal
and might even signal the availability of a positive net
present value project.
Thepositive effects of issue sizeon the abnormal returns
associated with securities issuance by capital sufficient
BHCs also might be explained by this hypothesis. Prior to
the institution of specific minimum capital guidelines,
market participants would have been unsure whether a
banking organization's common stock issuance wasdue to
regulatory pressure. Since there was some chance that it
was, there wasa small mean negative announcementeffect
even for capital sufficient organizations. However, afte
specific capital guidelines were introduced, market pat
ticipants could be confident thatacommon stock issueby a
capital sufficient BHC was not a signal that regulators
viewed the organization's earning prospects unfavorably.
As a result, in the post-1981 regulatory period, the esti-
mated mean abnormal returns associated with capital
sufficient BHCs' common stock issuance were positive
and were positively related to the size of the issue.
V.Conclusions
The results of this paper yield some important conclu-
sions regarding the stock price effects of BHCs' securities
issuance, especially securities issued by weakly-capital-
ized banks under regulatory pressure to boost capital.
These findings are particularly important in light of the
new risk-based capital requirements, which will require
many banking organizations to increase their capital-to-
asset ratios.
First, common stock issuance appears to have nega-
tive and statistically significant announcement effects for
weakly-capitalized banking organizations under regula-
tory pressure to raise capital. Moreover, the effects are
fairly large, implying a mean abnormal return of - 2
percent (which represents a dilution effect of about - 30
percent) forcapital deficient banking organizations during
the post-1981 period. Thus, contrary to the implication of
some previous studies, one cannot be sanguine that the
more objective capital regulation in place since December
1981 has significantly reduced the announcement effects
associated with common stock issuance for those BHCs
underregulatory pressure to augment capital. However,no
evidence of negative announcement effects is found for
BHCs that are meeting or exceeding regulatory capital
guidelines.
Second, common equity (and debt that will be con-
verted into common equity) might appear to be the most
costly form of capital from the banking organization's
16
standpoint since it has the largest negative announcement
effects. Straight subordinated debt and limited life pre-
ferred have no significant stock price effects, and per-
petual preferred actually appears to have positive effects.
However, it is difficult to draw any strong policy conclu-
sions from these results. One reason is that market partici-
pants may have viewed subordinated debt and preferred
stock as being at least partially implicitly insured through-
out this period.P Another reason is that the estimated
announcement effects presumably result from optimizing
decisions at the banking organization level. Thus, if alter-
natives to common stock issuance were used instead, it is
unclear whether theywouldhavelowercosts. Finally,these
results may reflect a decrease in the risk exposure of the
deposit insurance fund (and a corresponding reduction of
the.capitalized value of the deposit insurance guarantee),
which was the objective of the capital regulations in the
first place.
Third, thedata donotpermit ustodetermine whetherthe
negative announcement effects associated with common
stock issuance simply reflect a negative signal about
institutions' values or whether they are the result of a
diminution ofthecapitalizedvalueofthedeposit insurance
guarantee. While the estimated announcement effects of
common stock issuance for capital deficient banking or-
ganizations appear to be negatively related to the relative
size of the issue, as the deposit insurance hypothesis
Economic Review / Winter1989predicts, the relationship is not statistically significant.
Nonetheless, regulators may wish to pursue a policy of
requiring more capital since neither explanation for the
negative abnormal returns implies that there are social
costs associated with more stringent capital regulation and
more stringent capital regulation does reduce the risk
exposure of the deposit insurance system.
Finally, these results suggest that banking organizations
with weakcapitalpositions will attempt toresistregulatory
pressure to issue common stock in order to meet capital
requirements because ofthe negative effectsonthe valueof
their stock. However,since there is noevidence ofnegative
effects for strongly-capitalized BHCs, they may not be
reluctant to issue stock to finance new, positive net pres-
entvalueprojects.21 Moreover, the absence of negative
stock price announcement effects for strongly-capitalized
banking organizations suggests that the deadweight costs
associated with common stock issuance are small or non-
existent for such firms.
ENDNOTES
1. Deposit insurance can be viewed as a put optionon the
bank's assets at a striking price equal to the promised
maturityvalue of the insured deposits (see Merton[1977]).
The value of the put increases as capital relativeto assets
decreases or as asset risk increases since both factors
increase default risk.
2. Keeley (1988) finds that even though bank holding
companies partially circumvented the more stringent cap-
ital regulations promulgated in the early 1980s, they did
nevertheless boost capital-to-asset ratios in response to
the regulations. Thus, it appears that BHes do respond to
more stringent capital regulations.
3. .tnDecember 1981, minimum primary capital wasset at
six percent of assets for banks and bank holding com-
panies with assets less than $1 billion and five percent for
organizations with assets of $1 billion or more except for
"multinational" bank holding companies which were ex-
empted. In June 1983, the five percent requirement was
extended to the multinationals. Finally, in June 1985, a
uniform 5.5 percent minimum primary capital-to-asset
ratio was set for all banking organizations regardless of
size.
4. Manyfinancial executives argue that issuing shares at
a price below book value depresses the stock's price
because it represents a "dilution" of share value. While
such a stock issuance does decrease book value per
share, it should not depress the market value of the stock
as long as the proceeds from the stock issuance can be
invested in assets that are at least as profitable as the
firm's current assets.
5. In contrast, Scholes (1972), following a different line
of reasoning, argues that the demand for a stock is
downward sloping due to heterogeneous expectations.
Although it is difficult to reconcile heterogeneous expec-
tations with market equilibrium (since people who think
the stock is undervalued should buy, thereby driving up
the stock's price, and vice versa) differential taxation
might explain heterogeneous demand tor a stock. Down-
ward sloping demand, in turn, would cause price pres-
sure when there is a new issue. This would explain why
only risky securities have negative stock price effects
associated with their issuance (since there would not be
heterogeneous expectations for riskless securities).
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6. As Furlong and Keeley (1987a, 1987b) show, the dimi-
nution in the value of the deposit insurance option associ-
ated with a given capital infusion is greatest for banking
organizations with the lowest capital ratios.
7. It is unclear why they included the year 1981 since the
first capital requirements did not go into effect until
December 1981.
8. There are two important limitations of the Wansley and
Dhillon study, First,they do notallow for potential changes
inabnormal returns due to the changed capital regulatory
regime beginning in 1981. Second, their announcement
period is the day of and the day after the announcement,
unlike the standard practice of using the day before
and the day of the announcement. Thus, they may have
underestimated the announcement effects, (Ifind that the
largest negative residual is on the day before the an-
nouncement.)
9. Abnormal returns are calculated using the mean re-
turns method, a procedure Brown and Warner (1985)
show is not very powerful if the events are clustered in
calendar time,
10, They also find significant negative abnormal returns
associated with the announcement of dividend reductions
both before and after December 1981, which is consistent
with the negative abnormal returns associated with com-
mon stock issuance.
11. Moreover, several of these papers use statistical
techniques with low power, Dhillon and Wansley use an
unconventional event period, Isberg and Brown use a
one-day instead of two-day event period, and Polonchek,
Siovin, and Sushka use the mean adjusted return model
instead of the preferable market model and use an uncon-
ventional three-day event period. Severalofthe studies do
not adequately disaggregate different types of debt and
preferred stock securities (that is,convertible versus man-
datory convertible debt, limited life versus perpetual pre-
ferred stock),
12. I also tested for the possibility that shelf-registered
debt would have different abnormal returns and found no
significant differences,
13. Although the point estimate of the effect of the an-
nouncement of a simultaneous common/debt issue is
17larger than that for common alone, the difference is not
statistically significant.
14. I also found a positive announcement effect associ-
ated with perpetual preferred stock.
15. Moreover, the probability of security issuance in-
creased forcapital deficientorganizations relative to cap-
ital sufficient organizations with statistically significant
increases for preferred stock and debt issuance. See
Keeley (1988b).
16. Another possible explanation for this pattern of re-
turns is that the size of the offerings relative to the initial
value ofthe firms inthe two groups differs systematically. I
tested for this by examining the relative dilution effects of
the two groups' common stock offerings. Dilution is de-
fined as the ratio of the change in the aggregate equity
value of the outstanding shares (percent change in share
price, times share price, times number.of shares, divided
by 100)to the total dollar proceeds of the issue. A dilution
ratio of zero percent means that the announcement of a
new offering does not affect the share price of existing
shares, and a dilution ratio of -100percent means that the
decline in existing share value equals the value of the new
capital raised by the issue. Dilution is interesting to exam-
ine because it could be that firms with the smallest abnor-
mal returns also had very small dollar value issues and
thus large dilutions.
For all BHCs Ifound a mean dilution effect of -27 percent,
about the same as the -31 percent dilution effect found by
Asquith and Mullins (1986)for industrial firms. Thus, even
though the percentage stock price effect for bank holding
companies is much smaller than that found for industrial
firms, the dilution effect is about the same, presumably
because banking organizations' stock issues typically
raise far less funds in proportion to their pre-issue value
than do industrial firms.
More importantly, the pattern of dilution effects isbasically
the same as the stock-price announcement effects. Capi-
tal deficient BHCs have more negative dilution effects
18
than capital sufficient BHCs and both groups show less
negative effects during the post-1981 period. Thus, sys-
tematic differences in issue size do not appear to explain
the pattern ofabnormal returns across capital deficient
and sufficient organizations.
17..: This variable is equal to.the value of the issue divided
by thepre-issue market value ofthefirm's equityminusthe
value of the issue divided by the pre-issue market value of
the firm's assets.
18. Two periods were pooled and a model was estimated
Whichal.lowedthe intercept and the coefficient to differ in
the two periods. For capital deficient organizations, the
change in both the intercept and the coefficient was
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For capital
sufficient banking organizations, neither parameter was
significantly different.
19. Keeley (1988c) argues that insured banks voluntarily
would issue capital in order to protect their valuable
charters, which would be forfeited in the event of bank-
ruptcy.
20. As long as subordinated debt and preferred stock are
not implicitly insured, there is no apparent theoretical
reason to restrict their use as a type of banking capital.
Theyprovide the same protection tothe deposit insurance
fund as common equity and they may have lower costs.
See Furlong and Keeley (1987c).
21. These results are consistent with several empirical
studies (Marcus and Shaked [1984], Ronn and Verma
[1986], and Pennacchi [1987]) which find that for many
large banking organizations, the fair value of deposit
insurance appears to be less than its price. However,
since the value of deposit insurance need not be cap-
italized into the value of the banking organization and
instead may benefit bank depositors and/or borrowers,
one cannot conclude from these results that more capital
would not significantly reduce the risk exposure of the
deposit insurance system.
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